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RACIAL CREDIT STEERING AS A DISCRIMINATORY
CREDIT PRACTICE UNDER THE
EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
WARREN L. DENNIS*
CHARLES G. FIELD**
I. INTRODUCTION
T IS A WELL established principle in the law of economic regulation that
certain practices which may be perfectly lawful in some market circum-
stances may be regarded as illegal when market configurations change.
In the field of antitrust law, whether the market structure is atomistic,
oligopolistic or monopolistic is a condition which becomes an element of
the legal standard and can transform otherwise unoffending conduct into
a violation.1 Similarly, in the field of civil rights enforcement, the test of
illegality can and often does depend upon the nature of the marketplace.
For instance, where racial transition is occurring in the area, conduct which
is not regarded as inherently wrong, such as heavy solicitation by real estate
brokers, can be considered unlawful because it contributes to panic, re-
sergregation and "blockbusting."2 Likewise, with respect to racial steering by
real estate brokers, the fact that the racial transition is occurring in an
area-is singularly important to the legal significance of the brokers' actions.'
The test for the legality of credit practices can likewise depend upon
the structure and character of the market in which the practices are carried
out. Although certain practices may not be inherently harmful and may be
based on an economic rather than an explicitly racial motivation, they
still may be regarded as having a racially "exploitative" effect or a racially
"segregative" effect depending on the demographics involved in each specific
situation. Where this occurs, such practices may be regarded by plaintiffs
and governmental enforcement agencies as violative of the law. Accord-
*B.A., J.D., University of Pennsylvania. Formerly, Trial Attorney with the Dept. of Justice.
Partner, Troy, Malin & Pottinger, Washington, D.C.
**B.A., Cornell University; Ph.D., Harvard University; J.D., Georgetown University, Former-
ly, Director, Real Estate Practices, U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development.
Associate, Troy, Milan & Pottinger, Washington, D.C.
I See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963); United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
2 See United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied
414 U.S. 826 (1973).
3 See Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975). "The concept of a racially
transitional neighborhood is critically important to this litigation, because it is within this
context that the activities of the real estate industry, in general, and the defendants, in
particular, must be scrutinized . . .if the real estate industry is allowed to operate un-
checked, the pace of racial transition will be manipulated in a way that will irreparably
distort any chance for normal and stable racial change." Id. at 1033-34.
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ingly, in an era of increased activism by the Home Loan Bank Board,
the Department of Justice and state supervisory agents, savings associations
may wish to anticipate developing areas of exposure under expanding civil
rights laws.
One such area of potential exposure is racial credit steering. This can
be defined as a practice by a creditor of referring loan applicants toward
governmentally insured or subsidized loan programs, or away from con-
ventional sources of financing, on the basis of the race of the applicant or
the racial composition of the area where the collateral property is located.
At a time when the government is placing increased pressure on associations
to participate in urban lending programs as a part of their commitment
to community reinvestment,' it is not unlikely that some associations will
be accused of credit steering, even where the practice is not engaged in
deliberately or with any intention to discriminate. This is so, in part, be-
cause of the expansive nature of the rules of interpretation which enforce-
ment agencies typically apply to civil rights laws the such as Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA) 5 and, in part, because of the inadvertent patterns
of behavior which emerge in the credit industry in response to economic
and regulatory pressures. Thus, the following somewhat subtle practices
might be viewed, in some circumstances, as examples of racial credit
steering:
(a) A practice by a thrift institution of referring all or most loan
applicants from certain areas to governmentally insured or sub-
sidized sources of mortgage credit, including the lender's own
service companies, where this correlates highly with the race of
the applicants or the racial composition of the areas involved;
(b) A practice by a thrift institution of actively soliciting applicants
for government-insured but not conventional mortgages among
real estate brokers and others who operate in or are a source
of loan applicants from racially transitional or predominantly
nonwhite areas;
4 The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, (CRA), 12 U.S.C. § 2901 et. seq. (Supp.
1978), places new emphasis on an association's record of lending in urban areas. A poor
record of serving the credit needs of the community can cause an association's application
for expansion or change in structure to be held-up, conditioned or delayed. See e.g., decision
of Federal Home Loan Bank Board (HLBB) granting conditional approval to branch ap-
plications of First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Toledo, found in SAVINGS AMl
LOAN LAw - 1979, at 255 (R. Alexander ed. 1979). Under regulations issued by the HLBB,
one of the twelve evaluation criteria to be considered under CRA is an association's "par-
ticipation in governmentally insured, guaranteed or subsidized loan programs for housing
small business or small farms." 12 C.F.R. § 563(e) 7 (j) (1979). See Dennis, The Com-
munity Reinvestment Act of 1977: Defining "Convenience and Needs of the Community,"
95 BANK. L.J. 693 (1978), and W. DENNIS & C. EMMETT, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
ACT: STRATEGIES FOR COMPLIANCE, A COMPREHENSIVE MANUAL FOR MANAGING OFFICERS
OF FINANCIAL INsTTrUTIONS (Pottinger & Company, Washington, D.C. 1979).
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et. seq. (1976). See also Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. Part 202 (1979).
Regulation B is an interpretative rule of general applicability issued by the Federal Re-
serve Board pursuant to § 703 of the Equal Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691b (1976).
[Vol. 13:3
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(c) A practice by a thrift institution of failing to inform all applicants,
including those who reside or wish to reside in a racially transi-
tional or predominantly nonwhite area, of the availability, suita-
bility and costs of both conventional and government-insured lend-
ing options for which they might qualify;
(d) A practice by a thrift institution of foreclosing more quickly on
delinquent or defaulted-on loans secured by property located in
racially transitional or predominantly nonwhite areas, than on
loans secured by property in other areas.
These practices are sometimes associated with a process known as the
"FHAing" of a neighborhood and are seen as violations of equal credit laws,
when, either directly or indirectly, they result in:
(1) Denying applicants freedom of choice in selecting the most suit-
able financing method, on a prohibited basis;
(2) Creating higher overall lending costs or different loan terms to
persons who do not have full access to conventional or privately-in-
sured loans, on a prohibited basis; or
(3) Perpetuating a segregated or racially dual housing market through
creation and reinforcement of structural differences between the
"white" market and the "nonwhite market," and "exploitation" of
these differences.
An entire literature has grown up describing this category of neigh-
borhood dynamic and its asserted negative impact on local residents, loan
applicants and lenders themselves.' The subject has also been the frequent
object of Congressional concern.'
6 Several studies undertaken by academic and community-based organizations have attempted
to demonstrate the existence of the so-called "FHAing" of neighborhoods by lenders.
Attacked as a form of "redlining" this process is seen as a self fulfilling prophecy in
which lenders offer only or mostly FIA or VA loans in older, low income, racially inte-
grated areas on the basis of a perception of risk which may or may not be accurate. The
neighborhood is then said to obtain a "stigma." Real estate agents and mortgage bankers
even unwittingly, react to profit opportunities by trying to achieve a high volume of
home turnovers and eventually abuses such "fast foreclosure" and fraudulent application
procedures develop. This leads to high default rates which begin to characterize loans on
properties in the area. Ultimately, whites are "steered" away from these areas while non-
whites "steered" toward these areas are left with few financing alternatives, because sources
of conventional funds for homes and businesses have withdrawn. The following is a
representative sampling of the literature which describes these kinds of processes: C.
BRADFORD. L. RuaxNwrrz & J. McGOWAN, Sample of HUD-FHA, Single Family Firm Com-
mitments in the Chicago Metropolitan Area, in THE ROLE OF MORTGAGE LENDING PRACTICES
IN OLDER URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS (Urban Investment Study Group, Center for Urban
Affairs, Northwestern Univ., Chicago 1975); F. CASE, INNER CITY HOUSING AND PRIVATE
ENTERPRISES (1972); A. Lyons, Conventional Redlining in Chicago: A Case Study, in THE
ROLE OF MORTGAGE LENDING PRACTICES IN OLDER URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS (Urban Invest-
ment Study Group, Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern Univ., Chicago 1975); B.
ROGER, CITIES DESTROYED FOR CASH: THE FHA SCANDAL AT HUD (1973); CENTER
FOR STUDY OF RESPONSIVE LAW, MORE HOLES THAN NETS: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF
HUD's SYSTEM FOR CATCHING AND DETERRING FHA LENDER MISCONDUCT (1977); NEW
YORK STATE BANKING DEP'T, MORTGAGE FINANCING AND HOUSING MARKETS IN NEW YORK
STATE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT (May 10, 1977); U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, REDLINING AND DISINVESTMENT AS A DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICE IN RESI-
CREDIT STEERINGWinter, 1980]
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This article will explore the possible application of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act with its multiple remedies and enforcement methods to
racial credit steering practices as described above.
II. THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT AND REGULATION B
The Equal Credit Oportunity Act is the most elaborate Congressional
assault against discrimination in the extension of credit. ECOA makes
it unlawful for any creditor, including mortgage lenders, to engage in un-
lawful discrimination.8 The Act and its implementing regulations parallel
two existing federal statutes which have been broadly construed to pro-
DENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS, (Report on Administrative Hearings 1977); OFFICE OF POLICY
DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOP-
MENT, FUTURE ROLE OF FHA (1977); C. Bradford, D. Marino & L. Rosser, Demand,
Supply and Marketing of Single Family Mortgage Credit in Mature Communities (Wood-
stock Institute, Chicago, 1977); J. Feins, Urban Housing Disinvestment and Neighborhood
Decline: A Study of Public Policy Outcomes (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago,
1977); A. Gold, A Report to the State Banking Commissioner Regarding Redling and
Home Mortgage Disclosure (Trinity College, Hartford, Conn., Jan. 1977); P. Greenston,
C. Macrae & C. Pedene, The Effects of FHA Activity in Older, Urban, Declining Areas;
A Review of Activity, Related Analysis (Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., 1975); D.
McKell, Housing Analysis in Oakley, Bond Hill and Evaston (January 1960-April 1974)
and Supplementary Study (August 1974) (Coalition of Neighborhoods, Cincinnati);
M. Murphy, A Study of Concentrated FHA Activity in Cuyahoga County and its
Impact on Racial Segregation (Housing Advocates Inc., Cleveland, 1977); M. Przyblski,
Perceptions of Risk, the Bankers Myth: An Eight City Survey of Mortgage Disclosure
Data (National Training and Information Center, Chicago, 1978); H. Taggart, Mort-
gage Disclosure: The Massachusetts Experience and the Future Role of Public Regula-
tory Agencies (report submitted to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, November 1976); J. Zinsmeyer, J. Turnock & A. Mott, Opportunities
for Abuse: Private Profits, Public Losses and the Mortgage Banking Industry (Center
for Community Change, Washington, Oct. 1977); Baltimore Dep't of Housing and
Community Development, Home Ownership and the Baltimore Mortgage Market (Home
Ownership Development Program); Northwest Community Housing Association, Mortgage
Disinvestment in Northwest Philadelphia (Philadelphia, 1975); The Society of Real Es-
tate Appraisers, Inner City Valuation Study (Chicago, 1975).
7 See for instance, the following hearings: Community Credit Needs, Hearings on S. 406
Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 1stSess. 1977); Proposed Amendments to the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter
Act, Hearings on S.1397 Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 95 Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Home Mortgage Disclosure and Equal Credit
Opportunity, Hearings on oversight on the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and
the Equal Opportunity Act Before the Senate Committee on Banking Housing
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Neighborhood Preservation, Hearings on
the cause of neighborhood decline and the impact, positive or negative, of existing pro-
grams, policies and laws on existing neighborhoods Before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Equal Opportunity
in Lending, Hearings on oversight on equal opportunity in lending enforcement by the
bank regulatory agencies Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Hearings on
S.1281 Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong.,1st Sess. (1975); Competition in Real Estate and Mortgage Lending, Hearings pursuant
to S. Res. 32 and 256 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Committee on Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Defaults on FHA-Insured Mortgages,
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis, Hearings on
Private Investment in the inner city, Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions
of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 21 Sess. (1968).
9'15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976).
[Vol. 13:3
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hibit all discrimination in mortgage finance: The Fair Housing Act9 and
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.10 These three statutes, taken together, provide
a "complete arsenal" of federal enforcement authority in the area of housing
finance discrimination, with varying overlapping enforcement roles carved
out for fourteen different federal agencies."
In general, prohibitions against discrimination provided by Congress
under ECOA are sweeping. Section 701 of the Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any ap-
plicant with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction-
(1) On the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital
status, or age . ..,12
Plaintiffs can be expected to argue that this language is simpler, more direct
and equally as broad as the antecedent language contained in sections
804(a) and 805 of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.1" In fact, it will be argued
that it is as broad as Congress could have made it and covers all the cate-
gories and prohibitions of sections 804(a) and 805.
Regulation B,' implementing regulations issued by the Federal Reserve
Board pursuant to section 703 of ECOA,1" provides a series of definitions
which, when linked together also appear to be broad.
Regulation B defines "applicant" as "any person who requests or who
has received an extension of credit from a creditor" as well as "any person
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et. seq. (1976). See particularly, § 3604(a), 3605 and 3617.
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 (1976).
"See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), which characterizes the scope
of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The fourteen agencies include the twelve
agencies listed in Appendix A to Regulation B, plus the Department of Justice and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Attorney General has jurisdiction
under both the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3613, and ECOA, 15 U.S.C. §
1691e(g),-(h). HUD has jurisdiction only under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3610.
12 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
1342 U.S.C. 99 3604(a) and 3605 (1976). Section 805 of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3605, states:
After December 31, 1968, it shall be unlawful for any bank, building and loan
association, insurance company or other corporation, association, firm, or enter-
prise whose business consists in whole or in part in the making of commercial real
estate loans, to deny a loan or other financial assistance to a person applying there-
fore for the purpose of purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining
a dwelling, or to discriminate against him in the fixing of the amount, interest rate,
duration, or other terms or conditions of such loan or other financial assistance,
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such person or of
any person associated with him in connection with such loan or other financial
assistance, or of the present or prospective owners, lessees, tenants or occupants of
the dwelling or dwellings in relation to which such loan or other financial assistance
is to be made or given: . ...
Section 804(a) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, makes it unlawful to:
[R]efuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate
for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any
person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
14 12 C.F.R. Part 202 (1979).
15 15 U.S.C. § 1691b (1976).
Winter, 1980]
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who is or may be contractually liable," other than a guarantor and the
like."6 Thus, a mortgagor remains an "applicant" for purposes of interpreta-
tion of ECOA after the application process is concluded and after a loan
is made. Accordingly, discrimination against a current mortgagor, including
discriminatory foreclosures activity, can be a violation. In fact, the phrase
"credit transaction" is defined as:
[e]very aspect of an applicant's dealings with a creditor regarding an
application for, or an existing extension of, credit including, but not
limited to, information requirements; investigation procedures; stand-
ards of credit-worthiness; terms of credit; furnishings of credit infor-
mation; revocation, alteration or termination of credit; and collection
procedures.1"
Thus, differential provision of information by a creditor to an applicant
is covered. Discrimination in the "terms of credit" is undefined and appears
to prohibit all differentiation in terms and conditions of credit on a pro-
hibited basis.
The language "every aspect of an applicant's dealings with a creditor
regarding an application" is likewise broad. First, under a Federal Reserve
Board interpretation, an "application" can come into being a very early,
informal stage of dealing.' s Second, it could be argued that a creditor's
activity designed to prevent an application from coming into being is, a priori,
an "aspect" of an applicant's dealings "regarding an application."
It is also noteworthy that the definition of "credit transaction" in
Regulation B relates to dealings which are "not limited to" those specifically
described in the definition. Plaintiffs will argue that ECOA extends to
a broad spectum of activities not specifically enunciated in the Regulation.
The rationale will be that this interpretation, in addition to being textually
justified, is consistent with the rules of construction which apply to broad
remedial civil rights statutes such as ECOA, which must be construed in
light of their overriding purposes."
Two additional provisions of Regulation B underscore its expansive
scope:
16 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e) (1979).
17 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(m) (1979) (emphasis added).
Is 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1979). See also unofficial staff letter from the Federal Reserve
Board to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (April 20, 1978). This letter was issued
in response to a request by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (HLBB)
for an interpretation which would make the HLBB's definition of application under its
nondisclosure rules parallel to the Federal Reserve Board's approach under Regulation B.
The HLBB's request and the Federal Reserve Board's response were bases on a proposal
made by the Pennsylvania League of Savings Associations in the course of rulemaking
before the HLBB.
"OSee Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307 (1969); Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc.,
394 F.2d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 1968).
[Vol. 13:3
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Regulation B defines "Prohibited Basis" as:
[riace, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, or age (pro-
vided that the applicant has the capacity to enter into a binding con-
tract); the fact that all or part of the applicant's income derives from
any public assistance program, or the fact that the applicant had in
good faith exercised any right under the Consumer Credit Protection
Act or any state law upon which an exemption has been granted by
the [Federal Reserve] Board.2"
This definition is expanded first in footnote three to the regulation
which reads:
This first clause of the definition is limited to characteristics of
the applicant. Therefore, "prohibited basis" as used in this part refers
not only to the race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status,
or age of an applicant (or of partners or officers of an applicant),
but refers also to the characteristics of individuals with whom an
applicant deals. This means, for example, that, under the general rule
stated in section 202.4, a creditor may not discriminate against a
non-Jewish applicant because of that person's business dealings with
Jews, or discriminate against an applicant because of the characteristics
of persons to whom the extension of credit relates (e.g., the pros-
pective tenants in an apartment complex to be constructed with the
proceeds of the credit requested), or because of the characteristics of
other individuals residing in the neighborhood where the property of-
fered as collateral is located."'
The expansion continues in footnote seven of Regulation B which formal-
ized Congressional intent to apply the "effect test" to discrimination on a
prohibited basis under ECOA:
The. legislative history of the Act indicates that the Congress intended
an "effects test" concept, as outlined in the employment field by the
Supreme Court in the cases of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971), and Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975), to be applicable to a creditor's determination of credit worthi-
ness.22
Thus, Regulation B might arguably be viewed as having been de-
liberately designed to parallel other earlier civil rights laws in scope and
breadth.
20 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(z) (1979) (footnote omitted).
21 Id. n.3 (emphasis added).
22 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) n. 7 (1979). The effects test, which was developed under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, increases the scope of prohibited activity since the
inquiry is directed toward the consequences of the defendant's actions rather than merely
the motivation for them. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
Winter, 1980)
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II1. CONSTRUCTION OF ECOA AND REGULATION B
WILL PROBABLY PARALLEL THE EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATIONS UNDER
OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS
Understanding how ECOA will be enforced becomes not so much a
matter of "defining discrimination" as it is a matter of articulating a legal
standard capable of being applied in varying factual contexts. The source
of legal standards by which creditors can evaluate their compliance and
potential liability under ECOA, in addition to the text of the statute, Regu-
lation B and the legislative history of the law, is the substantial body of
existing judicial precedent under a variety of other existing civil rights
laws. This is particularly so with respect to laws such as the Fair Housing
Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which are directed at goals similar
to those of ECOA.
ECOA provides:
No person by a violation of this subchapter and by a violation of section
3605 of title 42 [section 805 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968] shall
recover under this subchapter and section 3612 of title 42 [section
812 of Civil Rights Act of 1968], if such violation is based on the same
transaction.23
This language fairly indicates that both ECOA and the Fair Housing Act
of 1968, in addition to overlapping textually, were intended by Congress
to reach many of the same practices. Thus creditors will need to deal with
the body of interpretative case law which has developed under Title VIII
as being directly pertinent to construction of ECOA and Regulation B.
This conclusion is also supported by the legislative history of the 1976
ECOA amendments. In its report to accompany H.R. 6516, the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, the Senate Banking Committee
pointed out that "this bill is intended to prevent the kinds of credit discrimi-
nation which have occurred in the past, and to anticipate and prevent dis-
criminatory practices in the future.""
Citing hearing testimony presented on the issue of racial discrimination
in credit, the Committee referred to the pilot project studies of racial dis-
crimination in mortgage credit conducted by the bank regulatory agencies
under the Fair Housing Act as examples of the practices to be prohibited
under ECOA. It also referred to testimony presented by the Department
of Justice regarding discriminatory mortgage credit practices:
Past instances of discrimination against racial minorities were cited
in the record. More recently, studies conducted by federal agencies
have indicated the strong probability of race discrimination in mortgage
23 15 U.S.C. § 1691e i) (1976).
24 S. REP. No. 94-589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 403, 406.
[Vol. 13:3
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credit.... In its testimony, the Department of Justice also noted the
emerging problems of credit discrimination as a result of the Arab oil
boycott; the Department urged the inclusion of race, color, religion and
national origin to parallel other civil rights legislation.25
Testifying on the impact of amending the Act to prohibit race dis-
crimination, the Department of Justice stated:
For example, the act, if amended in this fashion, would reach the
practice of "racial redlining."
While the Department has taken the position that racial redlining
is covered by sections 804, 805, and 817 of the Fair Housing Act,
this issue has not been resolved by the courts.
Amending the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to include discrimi-
nation on account of race would remove any possible doubt that Con-
gress intended to proscribe racial redlining and would provide the De-
partment with additional tool in eliminating this practice. 6
In urging House action on an early version of what ended up as the
1976 ECOA amendments, Congresswoman Sullivan, a principal proponent
of the equal credit legislation, commented that provisions prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, religion and national origin should
not be considered controversial since "the government has had four years
of experience under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 in banning such dis-
crimination in housing. So it is not a new and uncharted challenge in the
credit field." '
Recently two federal district courts have applied precedents under the
Fair Housing Act to cases brought under ECOA. In Shuman v. Standard
Oil Co. of California,"5 the court found that the awards of damages under
ECOA are conceptually similar to awards of damages permitted under the
Fair Housing Act. The court stated that the analogy drawn between the
two acts to be "persuasive since both acts are statutory remedies for denial
of civil rights.2" In a similar vein, the court in Missin v. Kellog-Citizens
National Bank of Green Bay30 held that a jury is required under ECOA just
as it is required under the Fair Housing Act.
25 Id. at 3, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 405 (emphasis added).
26 Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments and Consumer Leasing Act-1975, Hearings
on S.483, S1927, S. 1961 and H.R. 5616 Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Aflairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 318-19
(1975). Within months after this testimony, racial redlining was ruled unlawful under the
Fair Housing Act. The court based its decision in part on an amicus curiae brief submitted
by the United States Department of Justice. See Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408
F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
27 120 CONG. REC. 34767 (1974).
28453 F. Supp. 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
2 0-d. at 1154.
30481 F. Supp. 742 (1979). See also Fernandez v. Hull Cooperative Bank, No. 79-509-G
(D. Mass. Nov., 1979).
Winter, 1980]
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Given this overlap between ECOA and prior civil rights legislation
plaintiffs will ask courts to interpret ECOA with the same breadth applied
to these other civil rights laws. This should be particularly so with respect
to the prohibition in section 701 against discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion and national origin.
IV. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
WHICH WILL HAVE A STRONG INFLUENCE ON INTERPRETATION
OF ECOA IN THE HOUSING CREDIT AREA
Although the interpretations given all civil rights laws may influence
the interpretation of ECOA, there are several cases construing the Fair
Housing Act which will be strongly influential. In Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company,"1 the Supreme Court found that one purpose of the
Fair Housing Act was to "replace the ghettos by truly integrated and bal-
anced living patterns."" The Court afforded standing to two white apartment
renters on the grounds that "while members of minority groups were dam-
aged most from the discrimination in housing practices, the proponents of
the legislation emphasized that those who were not the direct objects of
discrimination had an interest in ensuring fair housing as they too suffered." 3
Under the Court's instruction, white persons who sought an integrated living
environment were denied the important rights of inter-racial association, and
thus were "aggrieved persons" under the Fair Housing Act. Recently, a
Federal Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court relied on
this same theory to recognize standing on the part of a township and those
who live in a particular geographic area to sue real estate brokers for alleged
racial steering."4 Thus, under the Fair Housing Act, indigenous residents
of an area have standing to prevent practices which arguably result in
the segregation or resegregation of their areas. Prevention of such segre-
gation, then, is one of the prominent goals of fair housing legislation.
Plaintiffs will argue that ECOA and the Fair Housing Act extend
to the same zone of interest. Regulation B expressly extends coverage of
the Act to discrimination on account of the characteristics of "individuals
with whom an applicant deals [including] the characteristics of other in-
dividuals residing in the neighborhood where the property offered as col-
lateral is located. '3 5 From this point of view, "steering" of a black or white
person to FHA-insured financing or to nondepository sources of credit on
the basis of racial composition of an area can constitute discrimination in
31 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
33 Id. at 211.
3a 3d. at 210.
34Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 441
U.S. 91 (1979).See also Broadmoor Improvement Assoc. v. Stan Weber & Associates, 597
F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1979).
3 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (z) n.3 (1979).
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the housing credit transaction just as it constitutes a form of discrimination
in a housing sales context. Both tend to perpetuate segregation.
More often, the courts have found discriminatory activity based upon
subtle action by intermediaries which abridges the purchasers' freedom
of choice." The racial nature of the conduct may be implicit, without the
necessity of race being overtly mentioned at any point. As in "blockbusting"
and sales steering situations, racial credit steering occurs in an atmosphere
"charged with race."I7
A description of the role of the real estate broker in a sales steering
case might be seen to strongly resemble the role which creditors might play
in credit steering. For instance, in Fair Housing Council of Bergen County,
Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Service, Inc.,3" the court de-
scribed the significant effect which intermediaries, who act between purchaser
6 In Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975), the court described the
subtlety with which steering can be achieved and the impact which it can have on freedom
of choice:
Unlawful steering or channelling of a prospective buyer is the use of a word or phrase
or action by a real estate broker or salesperson which is intended to influence the choice
of a prospective property buyer on a racial basis. United States v. Robbins, 1974 P-H EOH
13,655 (S.D. Fla. 1974). Where choice influencing factors such as race are not elimi-
nated, freedom of choice in the purchase of real estate becomes a fantasy. Coppedge
v. Franklin County Board of Education, 273 F. Supp. 289, 298-299, (E.D.N.C.
1967), afl'd 394 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1968); Lee v. Macon County Board of Education,
267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967), affd sub. nom., Wallace v. United States, 389
U.S. 215 ... (1967). It is the freedom of choice for the purchaser which the Fair
Housing Act protects. Hence, race need not be the sole reason for the defendant's
conduct if it is an element of that conduct. Williamson v. Hampton Management Co.,
339 F. Supp. 1146, 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
Accordingly, any action by a real estate agent which in any way impedes, delays or
discourages on a racial basis a prospective homebuyer from purchasing housing is un-
lawful. This is in accord with the position taken in Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630,
652-3 (D.C. Cir. 1972), where the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated
that the Fair Housing Act was intended to have "the broadest objectives and scope"
and to prohibit not only open, direct discrimination but also all practices which have
a racially discouraging effect.
It is the opinion of this Court that when a real estate agent actively undertakes
an effort to influence the choice of a prospective homebuyer on a racial basis, whether
on his own initiative or in response to the buyer's initiative, the agent either directly
or indirectly discourages the prospective homebuyer from purchasing a home in a
particular area. Where available housing has been traditionally denied to blacks because
of their race, this conduct tends to perpetuate racially segregated communities. The
Court, therefore, concludes as a matter of law that steering is a violation of Section
3604(a) of the Fair Housing Law.
Id. at 1047-48 (emphasis added).
37 One District Court described this racially charged atmosphere as follows:
In this maelstrom, the atmosphere is necessarily charged with Race, whether ment-
ioned or not, and as a result, there is very little cause or necessity for an agent to make
direct representations as to race or as to what is going on. On the contrary both sides
already know, all too well, what is going on. In short, for an agent to get a listing
or make a sale because of racial tensions in such an area is relatively easy, whereas
the direction mention of race in making the sale is superfluous and wholly unnecessary.
United States v. Mitchell, 335 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (emphasis by the
Court) aff'd sub. nom. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
38422 F. Supp. 1071 (D.C.N.J. 1976).
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and seller, can have in preserving segregated housing patterns. The court
noted that not only are the services of such intermediaries "crucial" in the
buying and selling of homes but also that the influence of their actions were
long lasting. Thus their efforts to maintain or extend segregated housing
patterns came within the purview of Title VIII. 9 Plaintiffs will certainly
seek to apply the same reasoning in the credit context by analogizing the
impact of the financial intermediary to the real estate intermediary. Further,
it is the freedom of choice in the selection of credit which the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act protects. Racial credit steering can be a discriminatory
credit practice when it results in racially-based, choice-influencing factors
being applied. In transitional neighborhoods, the steering of borrowers to
FHA insured sources of credit and away from conventional sources of financ-
ing is sometimes closely tied to the racial steering in the sale of real estate
and to blockbusting phenomena. Thus, it is on occasion, part of the same
process of perpetuating segregation.
Lenders can anticipate that plaintiffs and government agencies will
assert that such practice falls reasonably within the prohibition of Regula-
tion B, as well as within the coverage of the Fair Housing Act. In one sense,
they will assert that the practice discourages applicants from "making or
pursuing" applications for conventional loans."° In another, they will allege
that it is discriminatory as to "information requirements,"'" the "furnishing
of credit information" from the lender to the borrower'" and the "terms"
of credit. 3 All of the above would be on a "prohibited basis," as that phrase
is interpreted under Footnote 3 of Regulation B and the applicable rules
of construction set forth in housing cases.
As noted, a comparison of the textual language of Regulation B with
section 805 of the Fair Housing Act," together with indications in the
legislative history of ECOA that the two Acts are directed at the same evils,
suggests that the "unqualified" prohibition in ECOA5 will be regarded to
be as broad as section 805. Accordingly, judicial interpretation of section 805
can also be seen as relevant to construction of ECOA. Three fair housing
cases can be expected to have great weight in an interpretation of Regu-
lation B.
In Harper v. Union Savings Association," the court conferred to the
"unqualified" phrase "terms and conditions" in section 805 of the Fair
39 Id. at 1075-76.
40 12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (1979).
41Id.
42 12 C.F.R. H§ 202.4 and 202.2(m).
43 Id.
"42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1976). See also 12 C.F.R. § 531.8 (1979).
45 S. REP. No. 94-589, supra note 25.
46 429 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
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Housing Act as being "entitled to the broadest possible construction" pur-
suant to the Supreme Court's admonition in Trafficante. On this basis, it
held that discriminatory foreclosure procedures are a violation of Section
805. The second case is Laufman v. Oakley Building and Loan Co."' Here
the court characterized the text of section 805 as "blunderbuss language"
and held that it prohibits "racial redlining," or the basing of lending decisions
on factors relating to the racial composition of an area. More significantly,
in Harrison v. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co.,"8 the court applied section 805
to a factual circumstance unique in its applicability to the kinds of contacts
that typically arise between borrower and mortgage lender in transitional
neighborhoods. Therein, a white plaintiff sought to purchase a home in an
integrated area but was told by the defendant mortgage company that less
favorable terms than those requested would be given because of the racially
transitional nature of the area. 9 The court held that such conduct clearly
violated the prohibitions of the law.5"
Each of these decisions will be potentially useful to plaintiffs in at-
tempting to apply to ECOA the same broad brush used under Title VIII.
Creditors should note that discrimination of the kind revealed in Har-
rison is generally regarded as "purposeful" discrimination. This is, race
47 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
48 430 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
49 The Court's description of the facts upon which liability was based is as follows:
Briefly stated, the plaintiff claims that early in the year 1974 he was living in an
apartment in an area of Toledo called the Old West End, which is in general a racially
mixed area. He decided to buy a house, and located one which pleased him some
seven blocks from his apartment. He entered into an informal, unwritten purchase
agreement with the owner, and gave the owner one hundred dollars earnest money. In
order to finance the purchase, the plaintiff desired to get a conventional mortgage loan
with a ten percent down payment with the assistance of the Mortgage Guaranty In-
surance Corporation (hereafter MGIC). Ultimately he succeeded in doing so and
purchased the property which was located at 2702 Scottwood Avenue in Toledo.
To commence his search for financing, the plaintiff looked in the classified
section of the telephone book and selected the defendant Otto G. Heinzeroth Mortgage
Company (hereafter defendant Company) to call. Defendant Company is a corpo-
ration and the defendant Otto G. Heinzeroth individually (hereafter defendant Heinzer-
oth), is its president and owner.
In his telephone call to the defendant company, the plaintiff talked with a person
who identified himself as the defendant Haugh (hereafter Haugh). The plaintiff says
that after he told what he wanted in a way of financing, Haugh asked where the house
was, and when plaintiff told him, Haugh said that was a bad area, as it was transitional
from white to black. Because of the racial problems there, the only conventional
financing available was with a fifty percent downpayment. Haugh said that if the
plaintiff would look for property elsewhere, he would probably be able to get the
financing he wanted.
Later the plaintiff talked with Haugh on two other occasions, with similar talk
about the racial character of the neighborhood. Haugh did reduce the amount of
the downpayment to forty percent, and in the last conversation, which was a personal
meeting on April 4, 1974, Haugh again elaborated on the racial problems. He sketched
a map of the area showing the location of the house and of Scott High School, which
Haugh said had ninety-nine percent black students.
Id. at 895-96.
5 0 Id. at 896.
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was an intentional part of the loan officer's motivation. In these cases, it
is not exculpatory to show:
1. that the intent was not malevolent;
2. that the intent was based on economic motivation;
3. that the intent was based on a perception of risk; or even
4. that the perception of the risk was accurate, when based on an
overt racial standard.
Similar interpretations will be urged under ECOA. Thus, the standard
may not be the lender's intentions but the impact of a particular course
of action. As held under the Fair Housing Act, "[a]ny course of conduct
or way of doing business which actually or predictably results in different
treatment of whites and blacks is a discriminatory pattern or practice, ir-
respective of motivation." 1 Accordingly, under this approach, even if a
person's principal motivation is to make money, sell property, or make
loans, a violation can result.1
2
Further, where purposeful discrimination of the kind found in Harrison
is present, it may not be a defense that dealing on a nondiscriminatory basis
will actually have adverse financial consequences. In fact, even where it
threatens the viability of the business, purposeful discrimination will not
be upheld by the courts. Consequently, a defense based on actual adverse
reaction of whites to blacks moving into a neighborhood has been held not
to be a reason for allowing discrimination to occur. This result has been
found by the courts to be necessary in order to effectuate the purposes of
the law and is a well established principal in civil rights.5" Creditors should
anticipate that principles announced under the Fair Housing Act will be
asserted against them under ECOA. Whether they will apply with equal
force in the context of credit transactions under ECOA, however, is as yet
undecided.
V. RULES FOR DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF PRIMA FACIE
CASE OF RACIAL CREDIT STEERING UNDER ECOA WILL BE
BORROWED FROM OTHER AREAS OF CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
In proving an alleged violation such as credit steering, statistics can
be expected to be important. Even where the violation attempted to be
proven is purposeful rather than "effects" type discrimination, creditors
5 1 United States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp. 1130,1133 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United States v.
Reddoch, 1 E.O.H. Rep. (P-H) 13,596 (S.D. Ala. 1972), affd per curiam, 467 F.2d 897
(5th Cir. 1972).
52 See United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 936 (1973) and United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
In Branch v. Deaver, 1 E.O.H. Rep. (P-H) 13,689 (N.D. Calif. 1974), prior bad ex-
perience with blacks did not justify a landlord's discrimination against all blacks.
53 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); United States
v. Long, I E.O.H. Rep. (P-H) 13,631 (D.S.C. 1974), rev'd as to one element of relief
only, 537 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976).
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can anticipate plaintiff's use of statistics to infer intent." In fact, in cases
of racial discrimination it has been held that "statistics often tell much, and
courts listen," 5 and "nothing is as emphatic as zero.""
Generally, in a purposeful discrimination case, statistics are important
for their evidentiary role, rather than a device which shifts the burden of
persuasion. Yet where statistics are highly probative, they may be regarded
as shifting the burden of going forward. Thus, under the Fair Housing Act,
statistics have often been held to make out a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination. 7
There are a variety of statistical configurations which can be probative
in cases of credit discrimination. Cases under the housing and employment
acts indicate that liability could be established on the basis of a statistical
showing combined with a showing of the absence of objective standards
to govern employee action. Thus, proof of statistical disparity combined
with proof of a creditor's failure to supplant loan officers' discretion with
objective criteria for determining whether a person qualifies for a conventional
loan of FHA loan might create exposure. 8
Recent cases have begun to more clearly define the distinction
between the rules of construction in purpose cases (disparate treatment)
and effects cases (disparate impact). Generally, the rules for establishing a
prima facie case of disparate treatment are governed by the decision of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green" and its progeny. Both a disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact theory, however, may be applied to a particular
set of facts simultaneously."0
As noted, Regulation B codified the Congressional intent that the effects
test apply to interpretation of Regulation B. Thus, the applicability of the
test derives not from action of the Board of Governors but from the intention
of Congress."'
The apparent underlying reason for the adoption of the "effects test"
under ECOA seems clear. As in legislating against employment discrimina-
54See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334-40 (1977).
55 Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1962), afl'd 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
5 United States v. Hinds Cty. Sch. Bd., 417 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir. 1969).
57Williams v. Mathews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1027
(1974); United States v. Youritan Construction Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 649-50 (N.D. Calif.
1973.), modified per curiam as to one element of relief, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Real Estate Development Corp. 347 F. Supp. 776, 784 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
58See Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 358 (5th Cir. 1972) (employment).
See also United States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp. at 1130; United States v. Reddock, 1
E.O.H. (P-H) at 13,596; United States v. Youritan Construction Co., 370 F. Supp. at
649-50.
5411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 405.
C0 Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
61 See S. REP. No. 94-589, supra note 25, at 4, 5, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 405-07;
H.R. REP. No. 94-210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1975).
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tion, Congress was not simply concerned with reforming mental attitudes
or eliminating invidious bias. Rather, Congress sought to achieve equal
opportunity in fact, eliminating the "built-in headwinds" 2 which resulted
from a history of racial discrimination and from systemic factors in the
housing credit market which inhibit opportunity for minorities and contribute
to segregation. Apparently Congress was concerned not only with the motives
underlying patterns of discrimination, but also with the objective phenomenon
itself.63 The application of the effects test in the credit area, however, can
be expected to be considerably more difficult than in other contexts, due
to the complex nature of a credit transaction.
At the same time, plaintiffs are likely to attempt to rely on effects test
precedents established under laws such as the Fair Housing Act and Title
VII, when suing under ECOA. Thus, recent precedents in this area may be
used to support the argument that racial credit steering violates ECOA,
though done for economic, racially neutral reasons.
In Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights," the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit set forth several
creative guidelines in applying the effects test to housing cases. These
guidelines may be readily applicable in a housing credit context as well.
62 401 U.S. at 432.
63 Significantly, section 3 of an early version of H.R. 6516 contained language which would
have limited an "effects test" construction of the Act. This section provided:
The fact that a creditor's loans to any classification enunciated in Section 701(a)
are not equal to the population percentage of such classification in the creditor's trade
area is not a violation of Section 701.
Congressman Robert Drinan (D. Mass.), a proponent of ECOA, made the following
comments relative to this provision and its deletion:
Despite the praiseworthy provisions and goals of this bill two of its sections gave
me a great deal of pause when H.R. 6516 was first placed on the calendar. . . . First,
language in section 3 of the act appeared to diminish some of the thrust of the
decision of the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
In that and other cases, the courts have held that statistical evidence showing discrimi-
nation constitutes a prima facie case which casts the burden on the defendant to
come forward with facts to rebut the presumption of discrimination. To undercut
that evidentiary rule, which has been a part of civil rights law for many years, would
be to do a great disservice to the attempts to eliminate all vestiges of discrimination
in American life.
I am pleased to note, however, that . . . an amendment was agreed to which
would remove the offending section from the bill.
121 CONG. REc. 16747 (1975).
64558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977). The most recent opinion in Arlington Heights was
handed down after remand from the Supreme Court. Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The Supreme Court has
continued its earlier bifurcation of the effects test rule by holding that it does not apply
to constitutional interpretations. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The
Court implied, however, that the effects test might apply under a statutory standard in
light of the importance of legislative history to statutory interpretation and, thus, the
case was remanded. The Court still applies the effects test to statutory interpretation under
Title VII. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States 431 U.S. at 324; Dothard v. Raw-
linson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). Cf., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299
(1977); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 431 U.S. 936 (1977), amended 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
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Construing the phrase "because of race" in Title VIII, the court ob-
served that:
Conduct that has the necessary and foreseeable consequence of per-
petuating segregation can be as deleterious as purposefully discrimina-
tory conduct in frustrating the national commitment "to replace the
ghettoes" by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.' "6
Holding that an "effects test" concept reasonably applies under the Fair Hous-
ing Act, the court noted that "intent, motive and purpose are elusive sub-
jective concepts' " in proving discrimination.' Further since overt bigotry
is now unfashionable, "evidence of intent has become harder to find" and
focusing "on intent permits racial discrimination to go unpunished.""7
Significantly the Court found that apparently neutral decisions about
housing can produce two kinds of racially discriminatory effects. The first
effect results when one racial group experiences a greater adverse impact
than another. The second results when an ostensibly neutral business or
governmental decision perpetuates segregation and thereby prevents inter-
racial association. This type of effect "will be considered invidious under
the Fair Housing Act independently of the extent to which it produces a
disparate effect on different racial groups"'8
According to this view, practices which perpetuate a racially dual
market in themselves constitute discrimination "because of race." This co-
incides with the perspective of the Supreme Court in construing the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Under this Act, the Court also looked at the impact
of real estate practices on the process of "ghettoeization": "when racial dis-
crimination herds men into ghettoes and makes their ability to buy property
turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery."6
Thus, in the housing area, courts seem to recognize the principle that
discrimination and other unlawful practices which tend to segregate or
"herd into ghettoes" can arise simply through the operation of a system un-
65 558 F.2d at 1289 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 1290.
67 Id.
68 Id. (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit followed Arlington
Heights in holding the effects test applicable under Title VIII. Resident Advisory Bd.
v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1977). In Rizzo, the Court was persuaded by the legis-
lative history of Title VIII which supported the conclusion that intent was not to be the
sole benchmark under Title VIII. Other courts concur. In Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp.,
536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1977), the Court stated that "effect, not motivation, is the touch-
stone because a thoughtless housing practice can be just as unfair to minority rights as
a willful scheme." Id. at 233. See also, Robinson v. Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032 (2d
Cir. 1979); Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. City of
Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Kennedy
Park Homes Assoc. v. City of Lackawana, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1012 (1971). CI. Boyd v. Lefrak, 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
896 (1975).
69 Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 442-43 (1968).
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concerned with its own impact: "Whatever the law was once, . . . we
now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be
as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the
perversity of a willful scheme."" ° This principle, in fact, these very words,
has been held to support the applicability of the effects test under Title VIII. 1
When applied to ECOA these expansive concepts add flesh to the bare
bones of the skeleton "effects test" mentioned in Regulation B."2 If so called
racial credit steering practices have the effect of leading to the resegregation
of neighborhoods, they might be viewed as discriminatory credit practices
under ECOA as well as discriminatory housing practices under Title VIII.
This, of course, can be significant since a plaintiff will have both procedural
and substantive advantages in suing under ECOA rather than or in addition
to the Fair Housing Act. 3
VI. AN "EXPLOITATION THEORY" MAY APPLY UNDER ECOA
Another related theory of discrimination developed by the courts
in the housing credit and credit insurance areas seems to be applicable to
construction of ECOA, and will also have an impact on the theory of the
illegality of racial credit steering. In Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc.,"4 the
court adopted an "exploitation theory" under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
That Act, which the court found applied to financing of housing, provides
that "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purch-
ase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property." 5
In Clark, the plaintiffs were a class of black citizens who had purchased
newly constructed houses in Chicago from defendants under land installment
70 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.C.D.C. 1967), affd sub. nom., Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc).
71 United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1179.
72 For an excellent in depth discussion of the effects test in the credit context, see Hsia,
The Effects Test: New Direction, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 777 (1977). For discussion of
the effects test as applied to lending practices prohibited under the 1968 and 1866 civil
rights laws, see Red-lining and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975: A Decisive
Step Toward Private Urban Redevelopment, 25 EMoRY L.J. 667 (1976); Redlining: Remedies
for Victims of Urban Disinvestment, 5 FORD. UanAN L.J. 83 (1976); The Legality of Redlin-
ing Under the Civil Rights Laws, 25 AM. U.L. REv. 463 (1976); Redlining: Potential Civil
Rights and Sherman Act Violations Raised by Lending Policies, 8 IND. L. REV. 1045 (1975).
See also Werner, Frej & Madway, Redlining and Disinvestment Causes, Consequences and
Proposed Remedies, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 501 (1976).
73 For instance, the Fair Housing Act has a six month statute of limitations for the filing of
complaints with the Secretary. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(b) (1976). Under ECOA, the statute
of limitations is two years and as long as three years in some instances. 15 U.S.C. §
1691e(f) (1976). ECOA has a ceiling of $500,000 or one percent of net worth on punitive
damages in class actions, and $10,000 in individual cases. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1976).
The Fair Housing Act limits punitive damages to $1,000 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976).
Further, financial need is the criterion for award of attorney fees. Id. This criterion does
not exist under ECOA.
74 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
7 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
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contracts during the period from 1958 to 1968. The defendants included
the building contractor of the houses and the various land companies through
which the houses were sold to the plaintiffs. In court, plaintiffs, claimed
that as a result of intense racial discrimination in Chicago and its metro-
politan area there existed a housing market for whites and a separate housing
market for blacks. The latter was confined to a relatively small geographical
area in the central city. The plaintiffs contended that the demand among
blacks for housing greatly exceeded the supply of housing available in the
black market and that the defendants exploited this situation by building
houses in or adjacent to black areas and selling the houses to plaintiffs at
prices in excess of the amounts which white persons paid for comparable
residences in neighboring urban areas, and on terms favorable than those
available to white buyers of similar properties.
Defendants contended that absent a showing of the traditional form
of discrimination, namely, that defendants refused to sell to blacks because
of their race, or offered to sell the same houses to whites at lower prices
or on more favorable terms than they offered to sell to blacks, plaintiffs did
not establish a case under section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.6
The defendants asserted that the houses they sold to the plaintiffs in the
black market were available to whites and would have been sold on the
same terms and for the same prices as sales to black plaintiffs. Therefore,
defendants argued, plaintiffs enjoyed "the same right" as enjoyed by white
citizens to purchase houses in the black market. Moreover, it was urged
that other sellers, and not defendants, discriminated against plaintiffs in the
first instance by refusing to sell to plaintiffs housing in other urban areas
and thereby excluding them from the white market. The defendants claimed
that an interpretation of section 1982 proscribe their acts would be tanta-
mount to holding defendants liable for the discrimination of others without
a showing of any discrimination by them.
The court, relying on Jones v. Mayer," interpreted the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 "as a broad based instrument to be utilized in eliminating all dis-
crimination and the effects thereof in the ownership of property.""8 This,
it can be argued, is reasonably similar to the language and scope of ECOA
when applied to elimination of discrimination in housing credit.
The court held, in language peculiarly well suited to the concept of rac-
ially dual credit markets:
We need not resort to a labelling exercise in categorizing certain ac-
tivity as discriminatory and others as not of such character for section
1982 is violated if the facts demonstrate that defendants exploited a
7, 501 F.2d at 330.
77 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
78 501 F.2d at 330.
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situation created by socioeconomic forces tainted by racial discrimina-
tion. Indeed, there is no difference in results between the traditional
type of discrimination and defendants' exploitation of a discriminatory
situation. Under the former situation, blacks either pay excessive prices
or are refused altogether from purchasing housing, while under the
latter situation they encounter oppressive terms and exorbitant prices
relative to the terms and prices available to white citizens for com-
parable housing.""9
The court reasoned that defendants could not justify discriminatorily
high prices for blacks on the theory that the defendants would have charged
whites the same price.
To accept defendants' contention would be tantamount to perpetu-
ating a subterfuge behind which every slumlord and exploiter of
those banished to the ghetto could hide by a simple rubric: The
same property would have been sold to whites on the same terms."'
The court did not accept defendants' defense that others, not they,
actively discriminated. Nor would it accept the argument that the economic
market place produced the results since the laws of the market place "are
affected by the continued market condition which is grounded in and fed
upon by racial discrimination - that is, the available supply of housing is
determined by the buyer's race.',' The court concluded that the dependence
of economic phenomena upon race was not a valid justification for the
price and profit differentials.
Contrary to the trial court's stance, the shortage of housing here was
triggered not by an economic phenomenon but by a pattern of dis-
crimination that has no place in our society. Accordingly, neither prices
nor profits - whether derived through well-intentioned, good faith
efforts or predatory and unethical practices - may reflect or perpetuate
discrimination against black citizens. We agree with Judge Will's state-
ment that "there cannot in this country be markets or profits based on
the color of a man's skin," Buyers League v. F&F Investment ....
Price and profit differentials between individual buyers may be justified
on a multitude of grounds for example, the prospective purchaser's
reputation or his financial position and potential earning power. But
price or profit may not turn on whether the prospective buyer has
dark or light pigmentation. 2
The practices complained of in Clark involved the substitution of in-
stallment sales financing for conventional financing in the sale of homes.
The court observed that land sales contracting obviated the involvement by
mortgage lending institutions who would have disclosed important appraisal
7 9
1d.
801d. at 331.
81 Id.
821d. at 332 (footnotes omitted).
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value information to borrowers about terms of financing. Purchasers, having
been denied this information, could not measure the disparity between
the appraised value and sales price.83
From the analysis in Clark, plaintiffs would argue that it is a discrimina-
tory housing credit practice to steer applicants to a particular type of financing
vehicle, where the lender is operating in a racially dual market, and a sig-
nificant correlation can be drawn between the type of financing offered
and the race of the applicant. In other words, where whites or buyers in
white areas seem to consistently obtain conventional loans from the same
lender, while nonwhites and buyers in nonwhite areas consistently receive
FHA or VA loans, a strong inference, if not a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion is established. Under the reasoning of Clark, the case is also made out
where the lender is operating only in the nonwhite side of the dual market,
unless some overriding economic justification can be advanced to explain the
racial disparity.
A similar argument is suggested in a pair of cases decided together
in the Northern District of Illinois: Ortega v. Merit Insurance Co. and Hern-
andez v. United Fire Insurance Co."
In Ortega, the plaintiff alleged the presence of a discriminatory financ-
ing scheme in the sale of credit property insurance." "Credit property insur-
ance is sold, generally, in connection with retail installment credit sales of
property. The insurance protects against damage or destruction to the prop-
erty during the life of the contract."8 Two types of credit property insurance
were relevant to the allegations:
1 ) single interest insurance, which protects only the creditor's interest,
defined 1 as the unpaid balance at the time of the occurrence of the
insured risk: [and] 2) dual interest insurance, which purportedly pro-
tects both the creditor's and the debtor's interest, so that if the de-
preciated value of the property destroyed is worth more than the credi-
tor's interest, the debtor receives the difference. Conversely, if the
property destroyed is not worth more than the creditor's interest, the
benefits paid under the dual interest policy will be no greater than those
paid under the single interest policy.
7
The plaintiffs alleged that United sold single interest insurance in stores
with predominantly Caucasian customers at a rate of $1.50 per $100 of
insurance per year. In stores with predominantly non-Caucasion customers,
83d. at 335-36.
84433 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. I11. 1977). Ortega and Hernandez were decided under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, which, like U.S.C. § 1982, is part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. It relates to
"contact" rights rather than "property rights." ECOA, of course, extends to both when
housing credit is involved.
85433 F. Supp. 137.
86 id.
87 Id.
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only dual interest insurance was sold. Dual interest insurance sold at the
higher rate of $4.00 per $100 of insurance per year. Merit was alleged to
have sold dual interest insurance at the $4.00 rate to selected stores, whose
customers were primarily black or Hispanic."
Defendant Merit moved to dismiss on the ground that there were no
allegations that it "sold property insurance to different people based on race,
and that none of the persons who contracted with Merit were in any way
forced to contract or were unable to purchase insurance from any other
person or entity."89 Merit stated that, at most, the plaintiff alleged only that
it has "sold credit insurance in minority neighborhoods at high prices."9
As to Merit, the court refused to dismiss the complaint.
We recognize, as defendants have urged, that the credit consumer
business is distinguishable from the residential housing market. It is
also true that the Clark opinion relied upon extensive socio-economic
testimony to support its findings. It is not our function at this time,
however, to determine the merits of the instant controversy. Plaintiff
has alleged that a de facto system of discriminatory credit insurance
pricing exists, and that defendant is exploiting this system. This is
sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss.9
In refusing to dismiss the case against the other defendant, the court
observed that it constitutes unlawful racial discrimination to sell only one
credit insurance product in a racially dual market when the defendant know
that another product might be more advantageous to the buyer/applicant.
With knowledge that dual interest insurance had no advantage to it
over single interest, and with knowledge of the racial makeup of its
customers and the practices of United, Aronson allegedly sold only the
higher priced insurance with its goods. As we stated in Contract Buyers,
[D]efendants' position elaborated is that if property is sold to a
negro above what can be demonstrated to be the usual market
price, there can be no discrimination unless the same seller actually
sells to whites at a lower price. It should be clear that in law
this result would be obnoxious. In logic, it is ridiculous. It would
mean that the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which was created to be
an instrument for the abolition of discrimination, allows an in-
justice so long as it is visited exclusively on negroes.
In sum then, there is no reason to distinguish a refusal to sell on
the ground of race and a sale on discriminatory prices and terms.'
SId.
8 1d. at 138.
IoJd. at 140.
9' Id. at 140-41.
92 Id. at 143-44.
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CREDIT STEERING
The possible application of this line of reasoning to so-called credit
steering practices is apparent.
G. CONCLUSION
While enforcement of ECOA should never proceed on the basis of
a preconceived conclusion as to whether discrimination exists in a particular
case, it should and does proceed upon a preconceived and clearly articulated
conclusion as to what discrimination is and how it can be recognized. Lend-
ers can anticipate and take steps to avoid future challenges by recognizing
the way in which credit laws such as ECOA are likely to be interpreted in
the future.
Based on precedents in the fair housing area, the concept of unlawful
discrimination in mortgage lending as a legal standard under ECOA will
probably apply to practices which go beyond unfavorable treatment on
the basis of the personal characteristics of the borrower, and apply to an
assortment of practices sometimes referred to as "redlining," "credit steer-
ing" or "FHAing" of a neighborhood.
Like the Fair Housing Act, ECOA most likely prohibits practices
which have a "segregative effect" as well as practices which have a dis-
proportionate, negative impact on minorities. Accordingly, specific practices
which contribute to or exploit a racially dual housing market or a racially
dual credit market and thus inhibit freedom of choice on a racial basis
will most likely be viewed as prohibited under ECOA by the enforcement
community.
Like the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ECOA may be interpreted to
prohibit "exploitation" of a racially dual market, even though the actions
are based on economic motivations. Accordingly, practices which result
in less favorable terms, conditions and availability of credit in one segment
of a racially dual credit market will also be regarded as prohibited under
ECOA.
Persons seeking financing to purchase homes in areas which are racially
transitional or predominantly nonwhite may be denied a full and free choice
of credit vehicles and financing options for which they might qualify. To
the extent this occurs it may be seen as contributing to the perpetuation of
certain racially dual market condition, inter alia, by "stigmatizing" neighbor-
hoods in a way which leads to increased racial polarization and a decrease
in freedom of choice. This situation affects both white and nonwhite ap-
plicants for credit in certain areas, but overall would have a disproportion-
ately more severe impact on nonwhite applicants who comprise the majority
of applicants seeking credit in the affected areas. In today's environment of
Winter, 19801
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federal pressure to have creditors reinvest in our older neighborhoods, thrift
institutions should take appropriate preventive measures to anticipate these
challenges.9"
93 Conventional lenders who participate in governmental financing programs may wish to
take steps to be certain that lending personnel do not, consciously or unintentionally, offer
or promote financing programs solely or more heavily in integrated as opposed to pre-
dominantly white areas. This would include being certain that homebuyers from certain
areas or those referred by certain brokers, not be presumed to be interested only in gov-
ernment backed financing alternatives. Conversely, conventional or privately insured financ-
ing should be offered or explained to all buyers who qualify. Lenders who have prepared
written loan underwriting standards or CRA Statements may wish to include appropriate
disclamatory language in these documents. Buyers from certain areas should not be
automatically referred to mortgage banking service corporations or other sources of gov-
ernment related loans, solely on the basis of geographic location.
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